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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SA I .T I i AKE COMMUNIS " EGE, : 
Petitioner, : 
: ' Case No, 930374-CA 
• v . 
: Priori I. y 7 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION : 
OF UTAH and PAUL T, KIRBY, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
• • Jurisdiction c\e: this appeal i s conferred * 
1 : ... • . .-, - --uini § 7 M i'a :i I ,' ' , 
providing i :.i appellate jurisdiction over "orders and decrees 
resulLxi : - « * - adjudicat vr- proceedings . : state 
agencies • .-.*.: . . issued - • e Utah Court of 
Appeals dated August 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the January 22, 1993, Determination and 
Order issued by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division is invalid 
because it was not signed by the Director, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) (Supp. 1993) and Utah Admin. Code R560-
1-4 (A) (1) (1993) . 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission erroneously 
concluded that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") could not 
extend the 30-day filing period for "good cause" pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993) because the ALJ's 
"jurisdiction" to consider such an extension ended on the 
thirtieth day. 
3. Whether the ALJ improperly issued his decision, 
that Salt Lake Community College's ("the College's") request for 
an evidentiary hearing was untimely, before the time for the 
College to respond to Paul Kirby's pending Motion to Strike had 
expired. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 1 is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16(4)(e) (1989), and should be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness, giving no deference to the agency's conclusion of 
the appropriate procedure. Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 
P.2d 369 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Issues 2 and 3 are brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), and should likewise be reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the agency's 
interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"). Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
Provisions determinative of, or of central importance 
to, the issues on this appeal are set forth in their entirety in 
Addendum A to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Paul Kirby, filed a complaint with the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD") on August 26, 1992, 
alleging that the College had discriminated against him. (R. 1-
5). After an informal investigation, an investigator and an 
attorney with UADD signed a Determination and Order, dated 
January 22, 1993, ordering the College to hire Kirby in a full-
time faculty position, and give him back pay plus ten percent and 
attorney fees. (R. 540, 549) (Addendum B & C). 
In a Response dated February 18, 1993, and filed 
February 23, 1993, the College requested a de novo review of the 
UADD Determination and Order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-7.1(5) (c) (Supp. 1993). (R. 551-57). On March 8, 1993, 
Kirby filed a Motion to Strike the College's request for a formal 
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evidentiary hearing as untimely. (R. 559)• On March 11, 1993, 
before the College had filed any response to Kirby's Motion to 
Strike, the ALJ issued an ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Addendum D), 
denying the College's request for an evidentiary hearing as 
untimely. (R. 579). 
The College then sought agency review with the 
Industrial Commission. On May 14, 1993, the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the ALJ's ruling that the College's request 
for a formal evidentiary hearing to adjudicate Kirby's 
discrimination claims was untimely. (R. 614). Subsequently, the 
Commission also denied the College's Motion for Reconsideration 
on June 8, 1993. (R. 639-41). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March of 1992, the College advertised a position for 
a full-time Spanish professor. (R. 555-56). Paul Kirby, a white 
male, and approximately twenty-five others applied for the 
position. (R. 60). Kirby was among thirteen candidates invited 
by the initial screening committee to interview for the position. 
(R. 59-60) . After the initial round of interviews, Kirby was 
ranked eleventh. (R. 60). The top six finalists were referred 
to the dean for further consideration, and the successful 
applicant for the position was Laura Gaona-Bradford, an Hispanic 
female. (R. 60). Kirby filed a complaint with UADD on August 
26, 1992, alleging that the College had discriminated against him 
when it failed to hire him for the position. (R. 1-5). 
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An investigator for UADD informally investigated 
Kirby's complaint and found that Kirby was a member of two 
protected classes, "white" and "male", and that the College had 
discriminated against him on both bases. (R. 544-45) (Addendum 
B). Randall Phillips, an investigator, and Colleen Trayner, an 
attorney with UADD, signed the Determination, dated January 22, 
1993. (R. 548) (Addendum B). The stated basis for the UADD 
Determination was the assumption that the successful candidate, 
Ms. Gaona-Bradford, had to have a Master's degree in July 1992.x 
(R. 545). Attorney Trayner, signed the Order, also dated January 
22, 1993, requiring the College to hire Kirby in a full-time 
faculty position as a Spanish professor, and give him back pay 
(approximately $2,000 per month since August 1992) plus ten 
percent and attorney fees. (R. 549-50) (Addendum C). Neither 
document was signed by the director of UADD, Anna R. Jensen. 
On February 23, 1993, the College filed a Response to 
the Determination and Order that included a request for a de novo 
formal evidentiary hearing with the Industrial Commission. (R. 
551). On March 8, 1993, Kirby filed a Motion to Strike the 
College's request for a formal evidentiary hearing as untimely. 
(R. 559). Three days later, on March 11, 1993, before the 
College had filed any response to Kirby's Motion to Strike, the 
1. This assumption was erroneous because the materials 
submitted to the UADD during the informal investigation showed 
that the applicant only needed to complete a master's degree by 
the time the employment began, which was fall quarter, 1992. Ms. 
Bradford successfully completed this requirement. (R. 76, 555-56) 
(Addendum G) 
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ALJ issued his ORDER OF DISMISSAL, denying the College's request 
for an evidentiary hearing as untimely. (R. 579) (Addendum D). 
The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
on May 14, 1993. (R. 614) (Addendum E). The Commission 
concluded that the general UAPA provision allowing for an 
extension of time periods for good cause, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993), did not apply to UADD proceedings and 
thus, no extension of the time for requesting a formal 
evidentiary hearing was available to the College for "good 
cause." (R. 615). The College then filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission, which was denied 
on June 8, 1993. (R. 639) (Addendum F). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The UADD Determination and Order, dated January 22, 
1993, that is the basis for the rulings from the ALJ and the 
Industrial Commission is not a valid order because it was not 
issued by the Director of UADD as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-7.1(5) (Supp. 1993) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(1) 
(1993) . The Director cannot delegate to subordinates the quasi-
judicial power that the statute explicitly requires the director 
to perform. The UADD, therefore, issued an invalid order and the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the order. Accordingly, 
the College requests this Court to vacate the final order of the 
Commission and remand the case, directing the Commission to 
return the case to UADD for entry of a Determination and Order 
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that complies with Utah law and Commission rules. 
Second, even if the UADD Determination and Order were 
valid, the Industrial Commission erroneously held that the ALJ 
could not extend the thirty-day filing period for "good cause" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993). This Court has 
held that this general provision of UAPA applies to intra-agency 
time periods. Moreover, the ALJ does not lose his power or 
"jurisdiction" to act in a case when the thirty-day filing period 
for review has elapsed. The ALJ is able to grant a good cause 
extension after the initial filing period has elapsed. 
Finally, the ALJ should not have ruled that the 
College's request for an evidentiary hearing was untimely before 
the time for the College to respond to Kirby's pending Motion to 
Strike had elapsed. The ALJ should have given the College an 
opportunity to respond to Kirby's assertion of untimeliness and 





THE FAILURE OF THE UADD DIRECTOR TO ISSUE A VALID FINAL 
ORDER DEPRIVES THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE MATTER. 
A. Under the UADD Statute and Commission Rules, Only the 
UADD Director Can Issue Determinations and Orders. 
Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act ("the UADD statute") 
governs the procedure for filing claims, investigations, and 
adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-7.1(1) through 
(16) (Supp. 1993). Section 34-35-7.1(5)(a) provides that when an 
agency investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his 
investigation to support allegations of discrimination, the 
investigator shall report those findings to the director. Upon 
receipt of that report "the director may issue a determination 
and order based on the investigator's report." Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-7.1(5) (b) (Supp. 1993) (Only an order issued in accordance 
with this section can trigger the 3 0-day period for requesting an 
evidentiary hearing on the discrimination claim). According to 
the statute, the Director is to issue the order. There is no 
language that discusses or recognizes any authority to delegate 
this duty to subordinates. 
The January 22, 1993, Determination from the Industrial 
Commission was signed by two employees of UADD, Randall Phillips, 
Investigator, and Colleen Trayner, Esquire. (R. 548). The 
accompanying Order was signed only by Ms. Trayner. (R. 550). 
Neither document was signed by the Director of UADD, Anna R. 
Jensen, as required by the Anti-Discrimination Act. 
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The Commission argues that "a careful reading of the 
relevant statutes and rules will show that the Division Director 
may delegate the authority to issue Orders "that it considers 
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter to a subordinate." 
(R. 739). In fact, section 34-35-5(1) (a) states only that the 
"Utah Antidiscrimination Division may: (a) appoint and prescribe 
the duties of investigators and other employees and agents that 
it considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter." 
There is no language or inference that permits the Director to 
delegate her section 34-35-7.1(5) decision-making powers to a 
subordinate. 
The Commission also argues that provisions of UAPA, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-5(1)(i) and -2(h) (1989), allow the 
delegation of the decisional function by the Director. Although 
the term "presiding officer" in these provisions can include an 
agency head's designee if one is authorized, UAPA does not 
authorize every agency head to have a designee. Also, no 
evidence has been presented to establish that the UADD has a 
designee, or a policy, if its director is unavailable. 
Consistent with the UADD statute that gives the 
Director the duty and the power to make initial determinations 
and orders, the Commission's own rules specifically delineate the 
distinct roles of the Director and her staff in the informal 
investigation process. Those rules state that the Director, not 
a designee, shall issue the initial determination and order. 
Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(1) (1993) (Addendum A). The rule 
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further provides that the Director may request legal staff to 
review an investigatory file and make recommendations to the 
Director prior to the Director's issuance of the initial 
Determination and Order. 
A valid rule or regulation duly promulgated by a public 
administrative agency is binding on the agency, and on individual 
officials to whom its terms apply. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 
363, 388 (1957). There can be no question that an administrative 
agency is bound by its own regulations. See School Bd. of 
Broward County, Fla. v. H.E.W., 525 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976). 
Moreover, there is a strong public interest in requiring 
government agencies to observe their own regulations. American 
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1858 v. Callaway, 3 98 F. Supp. 
176, 196 (D. Ala, 1975) . 
Courts have consistently held that an administrative 
decision or order must be made by an officer authorized to do so. 
The decision of the administrative officer must ultimately be 
that of the officer himself, who bears full legal and personal 
accountability for that which bears his name. Braniff Airways, 
Inc. v. C.A.B., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Likewise, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that although evidence may 
be taken by an examiner, and may be "sifted and analyzed" by 
subordinates, "the officer who makes the determinations must 
himself consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them. 
That duty may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a 
substantial manner is inseparable from the exercise of the 
10 
important authority conferred." Morgan v. United States, 298 
U.S. 468, 481-482 (1936). 
Similarly, the UADD statute confers upon the UADD 
Director the authority of issuing determinations and orders. 
Although the director may rely on investigators to compile 
evidence, the Director, herself, must nevertheless make the final 
determination. An improper UADD ruling, as in this case, could 
prove extremely costly to a defendant. If this order, signed by 
an employee lacking the proper authority, is upheld, the College 
will have to create a full-time faculty position for which it 
does not have the resources or fire a qualified faculty member. 
The evidence before the UADD informal investigator 
correctly showed that the successful candidate need only receive 
the required Master's degree by Fall quarter, when the teaching 
position would begin. (R. 555-56) (Addendum G). However, the 
employees that issued the determination and order based their 
decisions on the erroneous assumption that the Master's degree 
was required at the time of the applicants' interviews, directly 
contrary to the evidence. This crucial oversight demonstrates 
the pertinence of the Supreme Court's conclusion in Morgan to 
this case and the statutory mandate requiring the UADD Director 
to issue all determinations and orders. The Director, acting 
with her ultimate authority, must "consider and appraise" the 
evidence herself before determining to issue a binding 
determination and order. In this case, not only did Anna Jensen 
fail to participate in the issuance of the determination and 
11 
order against the College, there is no evidence that Anna Jensen 
ever reviewed any of the evidence. The allowance of such 
improper agency action would effectively destroy the critically 
important checks and balances provided in the UADD statute. 
The issue of jurisdiction and the importance of an 
authorized signature on an order has been previously addressed in 
the context of appellate court review of an inferior court order. 
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Griffin, 750 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 
1987), this Court held that when the record reveals no judgment 
or sentencing order signed by the trial court, the appellate 
court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
appeal due to the absence of a final judgment. Similarly, the 
record in this case reveals no order signed by the authorized 
official from UADD, therefore the ALJ and Industrial Commission 
are without jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Thus, there is 
to date, no valid UADD order that would commence the 30-day 
period in section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) . 
Under Utah administrative law, decisions of an 
administrative agency must be made by those in which the law 
vests the power of the decision. The plain language of the UADD 
statute and controlling case law mandate that only the Director 
has the authority to make initial determinations and issue orders 
in discrimination cases. However, in this case, there is no 
evidence that the authorized official, Director Anna Jensen, ever 
saw the investigator's report, reviewed any evidence, or 
participated in the final determination against the College. 
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Because the UADD Director did not issue the order, as required by 
statute and agency rules, the purported UADD order against the 
College is not valid. And, as a result, the Industrial 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. 
B. The Director Cannot Delegate to Subordinates the 
Quasi-Judicial Function that Section 34-35-7.1(5) 
Requires Her to Perform. 
Section 34-35-7.1(5) grants the UADD Director quasi-
judicia] authority to determine the merits of discrimination 
complaints and to issue orders binding on the parties. 
Administrative officers cannot delegate to subordinates powers or 
functions that are quasi-judicial in character or which require 
the exercise of judgment, and subordinate officials have no power 
with respect to such duties. State Tax Comm'n v. Katsis, 90 Utah 
406, 62 P.2d 120, 122 (1936). The fact that the legislature gave 
the Commission authority to employ investigators, attorneys and 
other employees that may be necessary to perform investigatory 
and administrative duties does not give the Commission or the 
Director any authority to delegate quasi-judicial functions to 
such employees. Id. 
Respondents claim that in instances of potential bias 
the Director may need to delegate her quasi-judicial power to 
subordinates. However, Respondents are confusing the delegation 
powers available to a "presiding officer" and the duties assigned 
to the "director" under the UADD statute. The UADD statute 
clearly distinguishes between a presiding officer and a director. 
A "presiding officer" under this statute means an agency head or 
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an individual designated by the agency head to conduct an 
adjudicative proceeding.2 However, the "director" is defined as 
the individual who manages the enforcement of the UADD statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(4) (Supp. 1993). The provisions 
concerning the issuance of determinations and orders refer only 
to the director. Section 34-35-7.1 (5) (b) states that "the 
director may issue a determination and order based on the 
investigator's report" and section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) refers to "the 
director's determination and order." Thus, the statute clearly 
specifies that only the Director can issue a determination and 
order, and does not permit the Director to delegate her quasi-
judicial function to subordinates. Moreover, section 34-35-
7.1(5) (c) provides for a de novo review by the Industrial 
Commission if a party is dissatisfied with the Director's 
determination and order for any reason--including the Director's 
bias. 
Although the UADD statute and rules allow for 
investigation and recommendations by subordinates, they also 
explicitly mandate that the determination and order be issued by 
the authorized UADD official, and that official is the Director. 
C. The Affidavit of Anna Jensen was Improperly 
Introduced for the First Time On Appeal and Should 
be Stricken From the Record. 
The initial Determination in this case was signed by 
2. The UADD Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15) (Supp. 
1993), states that a "presiding officer" means the same as the 
term's definition in UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(h) 
(1989) . 
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two UADD employees, Randall Phillips, an investigator and Colleen 
Trayner, an attorney. (R. 548). The accompanying Order was 
signed only by the attorney. (R. 550). On appeal, the 
Commission now asserts that Anna Jensen, the UADD Director, 
delegated her decision-making authority because of her sua sponte 
concerns about the appearance of partiality toward the College. 
(R. 737-38). The Commission relies upon the Affidavit of Anna 
Jensen and its conclusory statements as a basis for its position 
that the duty to issue an order can be and was in fact 
delegated.3 
Even if this Court determines that the Director's 
quasi-judicial function can be delegated to subordinates in cases 
of potential bias, there is no evidence in the agency record to 
support the Commission's belated assertions that the Director was 
potentially biased, that this bias was the basis for her 
delegation, and that delegation in fact occurred. 
The Commission first introduced these "facts" on appeal 
when it submitted an Affidavit of Anna Jensen with its Memorandum 
in Opposition to the College's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
3. The Commission also asserts: "Anna Jensen's Affidavit 
shows that the delegation authority Petitioner complains of did 
not prejudice the Petitioner, but, rather, resulted in an Order 
which was legal, fair and unbiased as required by the Act." (R. 
738) . The determination of whether a legal, fair, and unbiased 
order was issued is for a court to decide, not Anna Jensen. The 
order issued by the Director's subordinates is invalid, 
regardless of whether it was prejudicial. However, if prejudice 
were the standard, the College would contend that it is per se 
prejudicial for the individuals who informally investigated the 
discrimination charges to also make the final determination and 
issue the binding order. 
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The Commission cannot present new factual evidence for the first 
time on appeal. Longstanding principles of appellate law dictate 
that the reviewing court cannot rule on a "question which depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Utah 1985); Uckerman v. 
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
Therefore, the College moves this Court to strike the 
Affidavit of Anna R. Jensen submitted with the Commission's 
Memorandum in Opposition and disregard all references it. 
D. Conclusion 
The UADD has not yet issued a valid order. The UADD 
clearly violated its own rules and statutory law requiring the 
Director to issue all determinations and orders. In addition, 
the Director cannot delegate her quasi-judicial power. In this 
case, to hold that the UADD lawfully issued the determination and 
order would vest power in division employees to make binding 
orders, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) and UADD 
rules. The purpose of this statutory scheme is to ensure a fair 
investigatory process and assure that binding orders are issued 
by the person with the proper authority, rather than by an 
individual who informally investigated the discrimination charge. 
Therefore, the College asks this Court to vacate the 
Commission's ruling on the basis of agency error, and remand this 
case with directions to the Commission to remand to the UADD for 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE COULD NOT EXTEND THE 30-DAY 
FILING PERIOD FOR "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63-46b-l(9). 
Section 34-35-7.1 (5) (c) provides, that "[a] party may 
file a written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing 
to review de novo the director's detrmination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order." The College 
sought a one-day extension of this thirty-day time period for 
requesting review of a Determination and Order in section 34-35-
7.1(5) (c) on the basis of good cause. (R. 583). However, the 
Commission concluded that the UAPA good cause extension provision 
in section 63-46b-l(9) did not apply, and that the ALJ lacked 
power to do anything in the case after the thirty-day period 
elapsed. (R. 614-16). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), 
the Commission's erroneous interpretation of the law has 
substantially prejudiced the College by precluding an 
adjudication of Kirby's discrimination claims in an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), 
nothing restricts "a presiding officer, for good cause shown, 
from lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in this 
chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993). This 
general provision of UAPA applies unless a superseding statute 
explicitly states that it is to apply instead of UAPA. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1993). In Maverik Country Stores. Inc. 
v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court recognized that a good cause extension under UAPA's 
section 63-46b-l(9) can be applied to intra-agency time periods 
for review. In Maverik, the employer was seeking an extension to 
the filing period for an agency rehearing but failed to show good 
cause. The court stated that "the authority to grant an 
extension in a filing deadline is not an agency-specific statute, 
but rather a general provision of UAPA." Id. In fact, the 
Industrial Commission conceded in Maverik that its intra-agency 
time limits could be extended under the good cause extension 
provision in section 63-46b-l(9). Id. at 948, 950. 
In this case, the College requested a good cause 
extension of an intra-agency time period in section 34-35-
7.1(5) (c) for requesting a de novo review of the UADD's 
determination and order. The Commission's inconsistent assertion 
that the good cause extension under UAPA does not apply to this 
time period is incorrect. In light of this Court's 
interpretation of the UAPA provisions set forth in Maverik. the 
College can receive an extension of the intraagency filing period 
for requesting review in section 34-35-7.1(5) (c) under the UAPA 
provision for good cause. 
The Commission's ruling that the ALJ had no 
"jurisdiction" to consider an extension after the initial thirty-
day filing period is erroneous. The Commission concluded that 
lf[t]he [College] failed to timely request an extension of time in 
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which to file or timely file its motion for review. Therefore 
the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action other than 
to dismiss this matter." (R. 616). There is no agency rule or 
applicable statutory provision stating the time period in which a 
party must request a good cause extension. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently upheld the Tax Commission's consideration 
of a request for a section 63-46b-l(9) good cause extension (of 
the period for filing for agency reconsideration) long after the 
filing period for both a reconsideration petition and a petition 
for judicial review had expired.4 Harper Investments, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div.. No. 920310, slip op. at 3 (Utah Feb. 2# 1994). 
The court thus implicitly rejected the Commission's view here 
that an agency is deprived of "jurisdiction" to consider 
extending a filing period once that period has expired. 
This determination is consistent with the approach used 
in the judicial context. Under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which applies to appeals from the district 
court to the court of appeals, a request for an extension of time 
to file a notice of appeal can be filed after the original 
thirty-day period has run, if it is within the next thirty-day 
period. Likewise, under Rule 48(e) the Supreme Court can extend 
the time for filing a petition or cross-petition for a writ of 
4. The Tax Commission issued its final order on January 9, 
1992. Harper Investments, slip op. at 2. The period for filing a 
reconsideration petition ended on January 29, see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-13(1) (a) , and the complaining parties filed their section 
63-46b-l(9) good cause extension request sometime after February 
20, 1992, which was forty-two days after the original agency order. 
Harper Investments, slip op. at 2. 
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certiorari if a motion is filed within thirty days after the 
original deadline. Utah R. App. P. 48(e). Such extensions can 
be granted for excusable neglect or good cause. See State v. 
Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582-83 (Utah App. 1992) (discussing time 
extensions available under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
This practice allows the district judge or the Utah Supreme Court 
to act in a case after the original filing period for invoking 
the next level of appellate review has passed; thus, expiration 
of the original filing period does not strip the judge or court 
of all power or "jurisdiction" to act on the extension request. 
Similarly, the ALJ can grant a request for a good cause 
extension that was filed after the expiration of the original 
filing period. The time elapsed should be merely one factor that 
will be considered in the "good cause" determination. This Court 
should hold that section 63-46b-l(9) good cause requests can be 
filed after the time period for requesting intra-agency review in 
section 34-35-7.1 (5) (c) has expired. 
Because of the ALJ's precipitous ruling, the College 
never had the opportunity to make its good cause showing to the 
ALJ. In Maverik, the court stated that "for an agency to extend 
any deadline established under UAPA the petitioner must show good 
cause." 860 P.2d at 950. In this case, the Commission ruled 
that the College's request to the ALJ for an evidentiary hearing 
was untimely before the College could respond to Kirby's Motion 
to Strike. The Commission, therefore, never gave the College a 
proper opportunity to establish good cause for an extension. 
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The Commission incorrectly relied on Varian-Eimac v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989), in determining that the 
ALJ lacked the power to act in any capacity after the thirty-day 
period had elapsed. In Lamoreaux, the parties were disputing the 
timeliness of a motion filed after the statutory filing period 
rather than the ALJ's ability to consider a request for a good 
cause extension of an untimely motion. 767 P.2d at 570. As a 
result, UAPA's good cause extension provision was not argued by 
either side and was never mentioned by the court.5 This 
decision would not require the ALJ, in the instant case, to lose 
the power to allow the College to file a section 63-46b-l(9) good 
cause extension. 
Instead, in Lamoreaux, the court was considering whether the 
Industrial Commission, having received a motion for review which 
was two days late, could decide the substantive merits of the 
case without first making findings as to the timeliness of the 
motion. Id. at 570. The court of appeals determined that the 
Commission, just like a court, must first determine whether it 
has jurisdiction and, therefore, remanded the case to the 
Commission, requiring it to make factual findings as to the 
timeliness of the motion. Id. at 571. In this case, Lamoreaux 
would require the ALJ to make factual findings to determine 
whether good cause existed for an extension in light of section 
5. The Commission, in its Order on Motion for Reconsideration 
and Clarification, dated June 8, 1993, stated that Lamoreaux was a 
"pre-Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) decision!]." (R. 
640) . 
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63-46b-l(9) . As mentioned above, the ALJ did not allow the 
College to establish a good cause for extension of the filing 
period, as allowed under section 63-46b-l(9), and thus failed to 
make a complete finding on the matter. Therefore, due to the 
Commission's misconception as to the ALJ's jurisdictional limits, 
the College has been substantially prejudiced. 
In conclusion, the ALJ had the power to extend the 
filing period for requesting review under UAPA's good cause 
extension. The ALJ does not lose all power to act in a case 
after the thirty day period has expired. Therefore, the College 
requests this Court to reverse the order of the Industrial 
Commission that affirms the ALJ's order of dismissal, and to 
remand the case to the Commission with instructions to send the 
case back to the ALJ to permit the College to request, for good 
cause, a one-day extension of the time period for seeking de novo 
review of the UADD's determination. 
POINT III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY DENIED THE 
COLLEGE'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEFORE THE 
TIME FOR THE COLLEGE TO RESPOND TO KIRBY'S PENDING 
MOTION TO STRIKE HAD EXPIRED. 
After the College filed its request for an evidentiary 
hearing with the ALJ, Kirby filed a Motion to Strike stating that 
the College's request was untimely. (R. 559). The ALJ then 
ruled that the College's request was untimely before the time for 
the College to respond to Kirby's motion had expired. (R. 579). 
The ruling was improper because it precluded the College from 
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providing its good cause showing for an extension of the filing 
period under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). 
The ALJ should have allowed the College to respond to 
Kirby's pending Motion to Strike before ruling that the College's 
request for an evidentiary hearing was untimely. Although a 
pleading is not required of the party opposing a motion, "the 
opposing party must still provide, if it can, evidence or 
authority to overcome the case made by the moving party." McVay 
v. District Court, 251 P.2d 840, 846 (Mont. 1953). Generally, "a 
party interested in resisting the relief sought by a motion has a 
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard." Id.; see also 
Edaar v. Garret, 456 P.2d 944, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) ("It is 
fundamental to justice and fair play that a party be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard on matters which affect his interest."); 
State v. Johnson, 594 P.2d 333, 334-35 (Mont. 1979) (finding that 
allowing party to oppose motion ensures fundamental fairness and 
fully informed court). 
Courts have held that "it is the right of the respondent, if 
he would take issue on the merits, to submit on the motion 
affidavits and papers in opposition to the motion." 56 Am. Jur. 
2d Motions, Rules and Orders § 20 (1971) (citing Bredfield v. 
Hannon, 91 P. 334, 334 (Cal. 1907); Randall v. Randall, 166 P. 
516, 517-18 (Kan. 1917)). The Judge "may not grant the motion 
without making a determination of the fact issues raised by the 
responding party." Id. § 20; cf. Gillmor v. Cummincrs, 806 P.2d 
1205, 1208 (reversing premature grant of summary judgment because 
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plaintiff was entitled to file response to defendant's motion to 
strike portions of affidavits opposing summary judgment). In 
this case, the College was not allowed to respond to Kirby's 
Motion to Strike and therefore could not raise the facts 
supporting a good cause extension of the filing period. Because 
Kirby's motion was based on the issue of timeliness, the College 
should have been allowed to rebut Kirby's motion by making a good 
cause showing for an extension before the ALJ made his ruling on 
the issue. 
The College, therefore, asks this Court to reverse the 
ALJ's Order of Dismissal and the Industrial Commission's order 
affirming the ALJ's order, and to remand this case to the 
Industrial Commission with instructions to allow the College to 
establish good cause for an extension. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the 
Industrial Commission should be vacated and remanded to the UADD 
for issuance of an order that complies with Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Act and the Commission's own. rules. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this rr/day of February, 1994 
L. A. DEVER (0875) 
Deputy Solicitor General 
CONSTANCE L. HUGHES (54 87) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
"°?" x rf the Utah Code Annotated provides 
"Coordinator" i "director11 means the individual who manages 
t ne e:;f o: cemen: c f t h i s* chapter. 
"Presiding officer" m< •<*:*£•" i ne same as * :;at term is d e n n e d 
in Section 63-4 6b 2 
. . _ Annotated provides 
- - ~- ~. *- .»:„aLiw*. ~. < ~m m^v: 
^ _ ana prescribe the dur.es or 
investigators and other employees and agents that 
it considers necessary for the enforcement of this 
chapter; 
3S-n n fS^ 'Svr^ 199J ,, •. cah Code Annotated provides 
,a, ii L:,e ;n;:ial attempts a * ., - - ..; -- * • 
unsuccess:J] and the investigator uncovers 
sufficient evidence during his investigation -o 
support the allegations of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice set out in tr:e 
request for agency action, the investigator sr.^, 
formally report these findings tr the directoi 
(I: •) U p oi i i eceipt of th = :i . ^ i.<=^... . L ^ e 
fill; ::i rector may issue 5 > ^ . o n and order based 
oi I the investigator "' s i epor t. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director 
for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the 
director's determination and order within 30 ***** 
of the date of the determination and order. 
If the director receives no timely request for a 
hearing, the determination and order issued by the 
director requiring the respondent to cease any 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
and to provide relief to the aggrieved party 
becomes t- e final order of th- r.;--?nmission, 
R. 560-1-4(A)(1) (1993) of the Utah Administrative Code provides: 
The initial Determination and Order of the Division, 
after the completion of an investigation on a charge of 
discrimination, shall be issued by the Director. The 
Director may request that the Commission's legal staff 
review an investigatory file and make a recommendation 
to the Director prior to the issuance of the initial 
Determination and Order. The Director may refer a 
request for agency action back to an investigator for 
further investigation when necessary. 
§ 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1993) of the Utah Code Annotated provides: 
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as 
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of 
this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the 
provisions of this chapter to every agency of the state of 
Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal 
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal 
interests of one or more identifiable persons, 
including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, 
suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an 
authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of all such actions. 
§ 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993) of the Utah Code Annotated provides: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict 
a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods established for 
judicial review. 
§ 63-46b-2(l) (h) (1989) of the Utah Code Annotated provides: 
(i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an 
individual or body of individuals designated by 
the agency head, by the agency's rules, or by 
statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an 
agency may substitute one presiding officer for 
another during any proceeding. 
within a reasonable Lime alter t*.*- C I O S L 
informal adjudicative proceeding the presiding 
officer shall issue a signed order in writing that 
states the following; 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative ox 
judicial review available to the parties; and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989) of the Utah Code .Annotated provides 
pertinent part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(d) ti le agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law ; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
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UADD NO. 92-0590 
EEOC NO, 35C-9?-n. 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
JURISDICTION 
Under the authority vested in me Ant i -D l scr imma t i on 
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the following 
Determination as to the merits of the subject charge. 
All jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
gyMHARY QF CHARQE 
On. August 26, J 992, Paul S Kirby, hereinafter Charging Party, 
alleged that Salt Lake Community College, hereinafter Respondent, 
discriminated against him based upon his sex, race, religion, and 
retaliated against him. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging party was 
subjected to discrimination, because of his sex, race, religion, or 
that it retaliated against him. 
• SUMMARY OF IN i/'EiJ 1IGATION 
Charging Party's Allegations 
Charging Party asserts that he was employed as an adjunct professor 
at Respondent during 1991. Charging Party asserts he ran into a 
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class scheduling conflict during the 1991 fall quarter. Charging 
Party asserts that he notified Mr. Stowers of such conflict. 
Charging Party asserts that he was eventually able to resolve the 
matter, and teach the class, but asserts that such incident caused 
Mr. Stowers to have animosities towards him. 
Charging Party asserts that subsequently, before winter quarter of 
1991, Charging Party went into Mr. Stower's office to look at his 
schedule. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers told him that if 
anything occurred again like the scheduling conflict he had during 
fall quarter, Charging Party would never teach at Respondent again. 
Charging Party asserts that thereafter, he and Mr. Stowers did not 
speak to each other very often. 
Charging Party asserts that, he was the most qualified applicant for 
the position, yet someone much less qualified than himself was 
afforded said position. Charging Party asserts that he attempted 
to resolve his concerns with Respondent's human resource 
department, to no avail. 
Charging Party asserts that in April, 1992, he submitted an 
application for a Spanish instructor position with Jonathan 
Stowers, Respondent's language coordinator. Charging Party asserts 
that he was denied due consideration for such employment, because 
he is non-hispanic, male, L.D.S., and because he objected to 
homosexual inferences during an interview with Mr. Stowers. 
Charging Party asserts that during his interview, Mr. Stowers 
received a telephone call. Charging Party asserts that after Mr. 
Stowers finished such call, he made sexual overtones towards 
Charging Party. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers stated 
that he was so excited to hear this person's voice, that he almost 
wet his pants. Charging Party asserts that he was offended by Mr. 
Stower's mannerism. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's knew 
that Charging Party was not homosexual. 
Charging Party asserts that subsequently during his interview, 
Charging Party commented about his Spanish L.D.S. mission, and how 
it had helped him with his knowledge of the Spanish language and 
culture. Charging Party asserts that during such discussion, Mr. 
Stowers squirmed, and made expressions that looked unfavorable. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers also served a L.D.S. 
mission. Charging Party asserts however, that Mr. Stowers has made 
negative comments to his students regarding the L.D.S. religion. 
Charging Party asserts that he followed the proper chain of 
command, and requested information from Barbara Pomerang, Kay 
Waters and Carlos Jimenez of Respondent's affirmative action 
committee, David Richardson, Respondent's dean, and Anne Erickson, 
Respondent's vice president, as to why Charging Party fell out of 
the running for the subject position. Charging Party asserts that 
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said individuals either didn't know why he was dropped, or did not 
sufficiently answer his questions. Charging Party asserts that Mr. 
Jimenez told him that he had thoroughly investigated Charging 
Party's case to see if religious discrimination was evident, and 
that he had interviewed the five employment committee members. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Jimenez refused to give him a copy 
of his investigative report. Charging Party asserts that Mr. 
Jimenez's investigation was not satisfactory. 
Charging Party asserts that he was qualified for the subject 
Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts that said 
position required a masters of science (hereinafter f,M.S.,,f or a 
masters of art (hereinafter ,fM.A.lf) degree in Spanish, or a closely 
related field. Charging Party asserts that he has received two 
B.A.'s in political science and Spanish, respectively. Charging 
Party asserts that he received his masters degree in language and 
literature, with a Spanish emphasis, in 1991. Charging Party 
asserts that he has received a variety of scholarships, has been in 
various honor societies, and graduated with a 3.8 G.P.A., in the 
aforesaid graduate field. 
Charging Party asserts that teaching experience is preferred for 
the subject Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts 
that he has such experience, as he has taught Spanish at the 
University of Utah since 1988, at the Division of Continuing 
Education, and is currently an adjunct Spanish instructor at 
Respondent. Charging Party asserts that he has taught forty 
courses during his teaching career (i.e. five credit hours). 
Charging Party further asserts that he has also taken teaching 
methodology classes at the University of Utah. Charging Party 
further asserts that he has participated in workshops presented by 
the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, Inc. 
Charging Party asserts that preference for the subject Spanish 
instructor position was to be given to candidates with demonstrated 
strengths in community college teaching. Charging Party points out 
that his student evaluations at Respondent's community college, 
show that he had great success in the classroom, and was able to 
relate well to his students. 
Charging Party asserts that non-teaching related work experience 
was preferred for the subject position. Charging Party asserts 
that prior to, and during his studies as a student and as a 
teacher, at the University of Utah, he worked an average of 25 to 
30 hours per week in non-academic employment. Charging Party 
asserts that such non-academic employment consisted of: assistant 
manager of produce at Smith's Food King; member of a saxophone 
quartet, which performed Mpro bono" for convalescent homes, schools 
etc.; donated time to help Hispanic immigrants learn basic survival 
Spanish in the Salt Lake City area; donated time as a translator 
for world conferences for the L.D.S. church; and worked as a court 
interpreter for Spanish speaking individuals. 
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Charging Party asserts that the subject Spanish instructor position 
was filled by Laura Gaona-Bradford (hereinafter "Bradford"). 
Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford did not have her masters 
degree at the time she applied for, and was interviewed for said 
position. Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford still did not 
have her masters degree as of October, 1992. Charging Party 
asserts that Ms. Bradford received her associate degree from 
Respondent, but does not have teaching experience at Respondent. 
Charging Party asserts that he has been discriminated against 
because of his sex, and his race. Charging Party asserts that Ms. 
Bradford is a female, Hispanic immigrant of Mexican heritage. 
Charging Party asserts that Respondent's policy is to hire women 
and minorities to fill college goals. Charging Party asserts that 
such action is reverse discrimination, because Respondent's offers 
positions because of a person's circumstance rather then he or she 
being the most qualified. 
B. Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations 
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional 
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are 
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every 
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking. 
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum 
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria, 
based upon the job qualification posted in the position 
announcement• 
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish 
faculty position. Respondent contends that Charging Party's 
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends 
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search 
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent 
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of 
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the 
dean/division chair. Respondent contends that the top six 
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final 
candidates for said position. 
Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by 
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that 
her application was received on April 29, 1992. Respondent 
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a full-
time salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter, 
1992. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her 
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish 
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience. 
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Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final 
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent 
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of 
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair. 
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted 
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation 
consisted of interviewing all search committee members. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to 
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search 
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally 
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr. 
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging 
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against. 
ftmvsis 
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 
2000(e), and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a), which provides that an employer may 
not discriminate against an employee on the basis of his/her sex, 
race, religion, or retaliate against any employee. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination 
In order to prove discrimination based on sex exists, Charging 
Party must prove: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he is 
qualified for the position; 3) he has been subjected to an adverse 
employment action; 4) similarly situated individuals, of a 
different class, were or would have been subjected to different 
treatment. 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, male. Charging 
Party was qualified for the position of Spanish instructor, as he 
had met all of the minimum qualifications for such position. 
Charging Party has been subjected to an adverse employment 
decision, as he was not hired for the aforesaid position. The next 
question is whether or not similarly situated individuals of a 
different class, were or would have been subjected to different 
treatment. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and 
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish 
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required 
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish 
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging 
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject 
position. The record indicates that Ms. Bradford was hired for the 
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subject position, despite the fact that she did not possess the 
required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has established 
a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 
B. Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination 
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based 
upon race, the Charging Party must show that he is a member of a 
protected class and that he has been treated less favorable than 
others in circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, white. The next 
question is whether or not Charging Party has been treated less 
favorable than others in circumstances which give rise to an 
inference of intentional discrimination. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and 
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish 
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required 
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish 
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging 
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject 
position. The record indicates however, that Ms. Bradford was 
hired for the subject position, despite the fact that she did not 
possess the required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has 
established a prima facie case of race discrimination. 
C. Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of Religious 
Discrimination Charging Party must prove that: 1) he was a member 
of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; and 3) 
he was not hired for said position because of his religious 
affiliation. Charging Party must maintain this burden to 
demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated 
employees. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's apparent dislike for the 
L.D.S. religion was a factor in his rejection of Charging Party for 
the subject position. However, the record indicates that Charging 
Party was not a member of the protected class, as he was active 
L.D.S. Charging Party has not asserted or established that his 
active L.D.S. status was in the minority at Respondent. 
Furthermore, Charging Party has not asserted or established that 
Ms. Bradford, the successful candidate, was non-L.D.S. or inactive 
L.D.S. Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima 
facie case of religion discrimination. 
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D. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
discrimination, Charging Party must demonstrate: 1) that he 
engaged in activities protected by the Act or Title VII; 2) the 
Respondent thereafter subjected him to adverse employment action; 
3) and that a causal link exists between the two* Love v. RE/MAX 
of America. Inc. . 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984); Burrus v. 
United Tel. Co.. 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 1071 (1982). 
The record indicates that although there was some animosity 
between Charging Party and Mr. Stowers, Charging Party did not 
assert any claim of discrimination until after Ms. Bradford was 
hired, and he filed this claim. Therefore, Charging Party has 
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
discrimination. 
E. Comparison 
Charging Party asserts that he is a white male, who possessed the 
minimum requirements for a Spanish faculty position, but was not 
hired. Charging Party asserts that Laura Bradford, a Hispanic 
female, was given said faculty position, despite her failure to 
possess the minimum requirements for such position. 
F. Respondent's Burden 
The next question is whether or not Respondent has articulated a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Respondent's 
arguments are set forth below for completeness. 
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional 
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are 
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every 
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking. 
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum 
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria, 
based upon the job qualification posted in the position 
announcement. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish 
faculty position. Respondent contends that Charging Party's 
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends 
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search 
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent 
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of 
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the 
dean/division chair. Respondent contends that the top six 
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final 
candidates for said position. 
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Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by 
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that 
her application was received on April 29, 1992. Respondent 
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a full-
time salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter, 
1992. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her 
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish 
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final 
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent 
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of 
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair. 
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted 
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation 
consisted of interviewing all search committee members. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to 
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search 
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally 
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr. 
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging 
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against. 
The record indicates that the subject Spanish faculty position was 
posted on March 27, 1992, and was closed on April 30, 1992. The 
record indicates that the minimum qualifications for such position 
are as follows: 
1. M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field 
required. 
2. Teaching experience preferred. Preference is given to 
candidates with demonstrated strength in community 
college teaching. 
3. Non-teaching related work experience preferred. 
The record indicates that at the time of his interview, Charging 
Party had a masters degree in languages and literature with a 
Spanish emphasis. The record indicates that the successful 
applicant, Laura Bradford, did not have a masters degree at the 
time of her interview, and was not expecting to receive such degree 
until June, 1992, nearly two months after the subject position 
closed. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had 
teaching experience. The record indicates that Charging Party had 
more college level teaching experience. 
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The record indicates that Charging Party had demonstrated strength 
in community college teaching, whereas Ms. Bradford did not have 
any community college teaching experience. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had 
similar non-teaching related work experience. The record indicates 
that Charging Party appears to have had more such experience. 
The record indicates that Ms. Bradford did not have the minimum 
requirements for the subject position, as she did not have a 
master's degree, or the preferred levels of experience. 
Furthermore, as a result of such deficiency, and according to 
Respondent's policy, Ms. Bradford should not have been considered 
for the subject position. Therefore, Respondent has not 
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. 
G. Summary 
Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
religion and retaliation discrimination. However, Charging Party 
has established a prima facie case of sex and race discrimination. 
Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in their entirety, 
indicate that there is REASONABLE CAUSE to believe that Charging 
Party was subjected to discriminatory practices as alleged. This 
concludes the Division's informal investigative adjudication 
procedure. 
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION, 
Randall Phillips, Investigator </ Date 
44X4 
11 sJanuairu 1993 
Collen Trayner, Esquire Date A 
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ADDENDUM C 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
UADD Case No. 92-0590 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
PAUL S. KIRBY * 
COMPLAINANT, # 
* 
vs. * O R D E R 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
RESPONDENT. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On January 2i, 1993, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of 
"Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has violated the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 
If the Respondent is desirous of attempting to conciliate this Determination, 
this must be done by contacting the director within ten (10) days from the 
date of this Order. Failure to reach conciliation shall result in the 
Respondent being required to provide the following relief: 
BELIEF 
The Respondent, UTAH COMMUNITY COLLEGE, is hereby ordered to provide full 
relief to Charging Party, PAUL S. KIRBY. Full relief shall include: 
1. That Respondent provide Charging Party with a position commensurate with 
a full-time faculty position in Spanish, effective immediately; 
2. Further, that the Respondent agrees to provide Charging Party with all 
lost wages, plus 10%; 
3. Further, that no retaliation be brought by Respondent against the 
Charging Party for bringing this action; 
4. Further, that Charging Party be awarded reasonable attorneys fees; 
5. Further, that Respondent reaffirms its commitment to comply with the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended• 
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal 
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30) 
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 34-
35-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request 
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if 
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence to be viewed differently. 
If the Director receives no timely request for a hearing, this Order becomes 
the final Order of the Commission with no further rights of appeal as 
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A. 
Colleen Trayner, Esquire Date Q 
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ADDENDUM D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615 
Paul S. Kirby, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
* ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
Salt Lake Community College, 
UADD No. 92-0590 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above 
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been duly considered, 
and it having been determined that the RESPONDENT has failed to: 
File its request for de novo review within 30 days of the 
date of the order as required by R560-1-4A(3) of the Utah Admin. 
Code (1993); 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good 
cause for dismissing the request, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or 
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission 
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be 
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or 
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking 
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the 




iministrative Law Judge 
Certified by.the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this //&day of*~?rf«^<L 1993. 
Patricia O. ission Secretary 
'OQSTS 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that on March_///,^y 1993 # a copy of the 
attached Order of Dismissal in the UADD case of Paul S. Kirby vs. 
Salt Lake Community College, was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Paul S. Kirby 
290 North 5th East 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Carlos A. Jimenez 
Director of Diversity/EO 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
SLC, UT 84130-0611 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By 





THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
PAUL S. KIRBY, * 
* 
Charging Party, * ORDER DENYING 
vs. * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
* 
Respondent. * UADD No. 920590 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
Motion for Review of the charging party in the above captioned 
matter# pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 34-35-7.1(11) and 63-
46b-12. 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) issued a "cause" 
finding in the above captioned matter by Order dated January 22, 
1993. The Order stated that the non-prevailing party had 30 days 
to request an evidentiary hearing. On February 23, 1993, the UADD 
received the respondents request for an evidentiary hearing. The 
request for an evidentiary hearing was denied by order issued on 
March 11, 1993, because it was not filed within 30 days of the date 
the order was issued as required by U.A.C. R560-1-4A(3) and U.C.A. 
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (c) . Our decision in this case is based upon 
jurisdictional issues and, therefore, we will not address the 
merits of the underlying case. 
On March 11, 1993 the Commission received a letter from 
respondent which stated that the respondent, "had a conversation 
with the Director of UADD, Ms. Anna Jensen. I had indicated to her 
that the College would indeed request a review of the findings by 
UADD....,f The letter stated that ff[t]he reason for the delay was 
due to a recent college internal procedural change. The new 
procedure requires such correspondence as the one requested to be 
circulated and viewed by appropriate College department heads.11 
Letter from Mr. Jimenez, 03/11/93. 
On March 17, 1993, the respondent filed its motion for review 
of the ALJ's March 11, 1993 order raising three issues: (1) 
whether the commission failed to allow a reasonable opportunity for 
Respondent to respond to the charging party's pleading before the 
order was issued; (2) whether the order was issued without 
consideration of Respondent's reply memorandum; and (3) whether the 
commission's action was manifestly unfair and prejudicial to 
Respondent and clearly contrary to the law which requires the 
Division to be fair and unbiased toward both parties. 
The respondent, citing U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9), requested that 
the commission allow additional time for filing its motion for 
review after the time for filing had run. The charging party 
asserts that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) does not apply in this case 





7.1(4) (c) , not the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) • U.C.A. 
S 63-46b-l(9) provides that: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
In order for a provision in a statute such as the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act to supersede a similar provision in the UAPA, the 
statute must make explicit reference to the UAPA. U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(1). U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(4)(c) does not state that it is intended 
to supersede the time periods set out in the UAPA, and therefore, the 
time for filing a request for formal hearing is governed by U.C.A. § 
63-46b-12. However, there is no conflict as both statutes establish 
a 30 day time period for filing an appeal. 
However, the Court of Appeals in Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), held that the time for 
filing a motion for review to the Industrial Commission is 
jurisdictional. The court reasoned that the mandatory language in 
the statute terminated the commissions jurisdiction once the filing 
time period was exceeded and noted that its interpretation of the 
statute was consistent with Utah appellate court decisions on similar 
time limits. Lamoreaux at 570. U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(d) provides that, 
11
 [i]f the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the 
determination and order issued by the director becomes the final 
order of the commission." 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and 
authority of the court to determine a contro-
versy and without which it cannot proceed." 
Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
App. 1987). If a court acts beyond its 
authority those acts are null and void. Id.... 
The sources of jurisdictional limits may vary 
according to they type of court involved. 
However, it is basic that "the jurisdictional 
limits of a statutorily created court... are 
circumscribed by its empowering legislation." 
Id. It follows that the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial administrative 
agency, such as the Industrial Commission, which 
is a statutory creation, would also be "fixed by 
statute." Retherford v. Industrial Comm'n of * 
Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987). Just 





determine that it has jurisdiction and, if it 
does not, dismiss the matter. Any action 
beyond its jurisdiction is void. 
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1989). 
An agency order is considered "issued" on the date the order 
is signed by the administrative law judge or commission. Bonded 
Bicvcle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec. 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 
12/04/92). Therefore, the order in this matter was issued on 
January 22, 1992 and that is the date that the time for filing 
began to run. The Respondent failed to timely request an extension 
of time in which to file or timely file its motion for review. 
Therefore, the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action 
other than to dismiss this matter. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued by the 
administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of 
Emol. Sec, et al.. 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92). The 
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of 
the hearing for appeals purposes. 
St'etohen M. Hadle^ 
Chalrmc 
%idc Um^ 
v Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified this /j£^ day of ^ 7 ^ , 
ATTEST: (I 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the day of , 1993, I 
mailed the attached ORDER in the matter of PAUL K30(BY V. SALT LAKE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, UADD No. 920590, first class postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
John S. McAllister, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Louise T. Knauer, Esq. 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul S. Kirby 
290 North 5th East 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Carlos A. Jimenez 
Director of Diversity/EO 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Timothy C. Allen 
Adjudication Division 
(via interoffice mail) 
Anna R. Jensen, Dir. 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND CLARIFICATION 
UADD No. 920590 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Motion for Review of the respondent in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-13. 
The respondent timely filed a motion for reconsideration of 
the commission's denial of its motion for review of an 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dismissing its request for 
a formal hearing under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 
The respondent requests (1) that the commission clarify the 
phrase "without prejudice" in the ALJ's order which was affirmed by 
the commission, and (2) that the commission re-examine its 
determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear its motion for 
review. We will examine these issues in reverse order. 
I. DOES RULE 6(e) APPLY TO EXTEND THE 
PERIOD FOR PILING A MOTION POR REVIEW? 
The respondent argues that Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 
569 (Ut. App. 1989) (Lamoreaux I) , does not compel an outright 
dismissal and points to footnote one of that opinion which states 
in part that, "Additional days will be allowed when the filing is 
sent by mail or when the last day of the period falls on a weekend 
or a holiday. Utah R. Civ. P. 6." Lamoreaux I, 767 P.2d 569, 570, 
fn. 1. The respondent further asserts that the Utah Supreme Court 
in Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), 
held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not 
clearly inapplicable to Industrial Commission procedure and 
therefore supplemented Commission procedure to allow timely filing 
of a petition for rehearing not filed within the 30 day time 
period. 
In Lamoreaux I the commission granted the untimely filed 
motion for review and reversed the ALJ. The commissions decision 
was appealed by the respondent to the court of appeals which held 
that the time limit for filing a motion for review before the 
commission was jurisdictional. The case was remanded so that the 
commission could take evidence on the issue of whether the 





Griffith and Lamoreaux I are both pre-Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA) decisions. The Utah Supreme Court in Griffith 
concluded that Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P.# which provides that M[t]hese 
rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except 
insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable" 
applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to supplement the rules 
of procedure of the Industrial Commission. The Griffith Court held 
that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applies to extend the time for filing a 
petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. Rule 1, 
U.R.C.P., however, provides that •• [t]hese rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the circuit 
courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah in all actions, 
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law 
or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as 
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the 
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81.,f 
In a later ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[w]hile 
the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil 
procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to 
administrative proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) .... Thus, 
administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so 
provide." Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly 
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
The UAPA provides in relevant part that "except as otherwise 
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by 
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter 
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. §~63-46b-
1(1) (1992). The UAPA does not state generally that the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative proceedings. To the 
contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, specific references to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) 
(providing that Rules 12(b) and 56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment except to the extent that those 
rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. § 63-46b-7 (providing that the 
rules of discovery under the U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not 
enacted rules for discovery); U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that 
a defaulted party may file a motion to set aside a default order 
under the procedures outlined in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. S 63-46b-
15(2) (providing that a petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the 
U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings and proceedings in the 
district court are governed by the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-
19(1)(c) (providing that the venue for proceedings to enforce 




agency orders is governed by the requirements of the U.R.C.P.). 
Therefore, under Pilcher, it is clear that under UAPA, only 
those sections of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
adopted by UAPA or the agency, or those which expressly state they 
are intended to apply under UAPA, apply to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE 
••WITHOUT PREJUDICE11 IN THE COMMISSION'S ORDER. 
The respondent notes that the order issued by the ALJ on March 
11, 1993 was issued "without prejudice.1' The use of the term 
••without prejudice" indicates that the dismissal was not based on 
the merits of the underlying case. We believe that we erred in 
simply affirming the ALJ's dismissal and that we should have 
dismissed the matter outright based upon our own review of the 
matter for lack of jurisdiction. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the District 
Court of the State of Utah within 30 days of the date of the order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-15, Alumbauah 
v. White. 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), and Couriers v. Dep't of 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER ON 
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KIRBY, Case Number 920590, on tft* day of (Jt^^x , 19&3 
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261 EAST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
J. CLARK WHITEHEAD 
DIRECTOR, PERSONNEL SERVICES 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
P O BOX 30808 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84130 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JOHN S MCALLISTER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER, SUITE 1100 
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
PAUL S. KIRBY 
290 NORTH 5TH EAST 
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037 
CARLOS A. JIMENEZ 
DIRECTOR OF DIVERSITY/EEO 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
P O BOX 30808 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84130 
ANNA R. JENSEN, DIR. 
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 




General Counsel's Office 
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Applicants may apply by mail or in person at the Salt Lake Community College Personnel Office, 
AD 160, 4600 South Redwood Road, P.O. Box 30808, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84130. Office Hours 
8 to 4:30. Job Hotline (801) 967-4133. Personnel Office (801) 967-4210. 
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sing (2 Positions)** 
ce Information Systems 
idgmic-requires earned master's by fall '92 in related area 
squires bachelor's). Vocational-reouires earned bachelor's 
all '92 in related area or six years of directly related work 
erience (•master's preferred, * •master's required), 
inning rank and beginning salary (mid. 20's approx.) 
endent upon qualifications. See individual position 
ouncement for all requirements. 
>UCATI0N PROCESS: Applications due April 30. 1992. 
i will be notified by mail or phone the status of your 
lication. Each position requires a separate set of 
lication materials. To be considered for employment you 
>t complete the following: 
Cover letter 
Official Salt Lake Community College Application 
Resume/Vita 
Transcripts (un-official photocopies are acceptable until 
hiring) and 
Three current letters of recommendation. 
d completed applications and supporting material to: 
Salt Lake Community College 
Personnel Services Office 
4600 South Redwood Road 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Phone: 801-967-4210 
Salt Lake Community College is a comprehensive urban 
college with two campuses (Redwood Road and South City), 
two centers (Sandy and International Airport) and two 
satellites (West Jordan and Magna) located in the Salt Lake 
Valley and a satellite located in Tooele Valley, 40 miles west 
of Salt Lake City. All of the facilities are surrounded by 
beautiful mountains abundant with year-round sport and 
recreational opportunities, including camping, hiking, boating, 
hang gliding, hunting and fishing. There are seven ski resorts 
within 30 minutes of Salt Lake City. Utah's professional 
symphony orchestra, opera, ballet and modern dance 
companies, several quality theaters (including the College's 
own Grand Theater), professional basketball, football, hockey 
and baseball teams offer a well-rounded variety of activities. 
Salt Lake Community College serves its unique and diverse 
15,375 credit student population with more than 120 
programs in the Schools of Business and Technology, 
Continuing and Community Education, Humanities and 
Sciences, and Occupational Education. Articulation 
agreements help students transfer SLCC credits to four-year 
colleges and universities. In addition, about 10,000 
individuals are enrolled in non-credit related educational 
programs. 
A kaleidoscopic experience is available in The Applied 
Technology Center, The Center for Entrepreneurship, Skills 
Center, Salt Lake Community Arts Center, Career Action 
Center, Child Care Center and apprenticeship programs. In 
addition, program choices range from cosmetology to truck 
driving, from welding to academic studies, from athletic to 
aviation maintenance, and from geology to graphic design. 
Certificates and diplomas are offered, as well as three 
degrees (AAS, AS, AA). 
SLCC is now serving 1,275 minorities and 850 disabled 
students. About half the student body are female. The 
average age of students is 28. The College has a national 
reputation for high quality technical graduates who have 
consistently won medals at VICA, PBL, DEX, and other state 
and national competitions. Our Medical programs have 
CAHEA and other national accreditation, and the new RN 
Nursing program is eligible for National League for Nursing 
accreditation. The College's Business programs are fully 
accredited by the Association of Collegiate Business Schools 
and Programs. 
What people are saying: 
"Best managed state government," financial World Magazine 
"Best city in which to do business," Fortune Magazine 
States ranked by health-UTAH t\. National Health Survey 
SLCC is an equal opportunity instituiij^/0^pV^nfl 
educational and employment opportunities without regard to 






Staffing Fall '92 
ACAPEMIg-Acrobice/Fitncas for Life, Biology, 
Chemistry, Communications/Broadcasting, 
Developmental Math* (2 Poe.), Developmental 
English Composition*, History, Humanities/Art 
History, Language (Spanish), Math (3 Po».), Political ] 
Science, Psychology, Sociology. 
VQCATJONALrBusincsa Management* Computer 
Information Systems*. Cosmetology, Electronics, 
Medical Assistant/Medical Secretary, Nursing** (2 
Poa.), Office Information Systems. 
Academic-requires earned truster's by fall *92 in 
related area f'requires bachelor's}. Vocational-
require! earned bachelor's by fall *9i in related area 
or six vears of directly related work experience 
('master s preferred, "master's required). Beginnin| 
rank and beginning aalary (mid. 20's spprox.) 
dependent upon qualifications. See individual position 
announcement for all requirements. 
APPLICATION PROCESS; Applications due April 
30, 1992. You will be notified by mail or phone the 
sums of your application. Each position requires a 
-separate aet of application materials. To be considered 
for employment, you must complete the following: 
cover letter, official Salt Lake Community College 
Application, resumcMia. iranacripis (un-officia) 
photocopies are acceptable until hiring) and three 
current letters of recommendation. Send completed 
applications and supporting materials lo: Salt Lake 
Community College. Personnel Serrices Office, 
4600 South Redwood Road, P.O. Box 30808, Sail 
U k e City, Utah 84130, Pbooe:801-9*7.4210. 
An Affirmatif e Action 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
bALT LAKE 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE] 
POSTED: March 27, 1992 
CLOSED: April 30, 1992 
POSITION ANNOUNCEMENT 
POSITION TITLE: Faculty Position in Spanish 
REPORTS TO: Director, Humanities Division 
STARTING SALARY RANGE: Beginning rank and beginning salary (mid 20's approx.) dependent upon 
qualifications for a nine month letter of appointment. Initial employment 
to begin September 1992. Night and summer teaching possible for 
additional remuneration. Excellent benefits. 
MAJOR FUNCTION: 
Under general supervision the instructor will teach primarily beginning and intermediate Spanish classes 
supplemented with courses in other languages. 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES: 
1. Provide instruction in beginning Spanish classes as assigned. 
2. Assess and maintain records of student performance. 
3. Develop consistent course outlines. 
4. Participate in upgrading curriculum. 
5. Attend regularly scheduled meetings and workshops. 
6. Maintain office consultation hours. 
7. Accept committee assignments. 
8. Advise students on program requirements. 
9. Accept other duties as assigned. 
(over) 
SLCC-AN EQUAL OPPORTUNTTY/AEFTRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER 
[ Quality • Service • Productivity ] 0 0 1 * 2 £ 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS: 
1. M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field required. 
2. Teaching experience preferred. Preference is given to candidates with demonstrated strength in 
community college teaching. 
3. Non-teaching related work experience preferred. 
APPLICATIONS: To be considered for employment, you must complete the following: 
1. Cover letter. 
2. Official Salt Lake Community College Application. 
3. Resume/Vita. 
4. Transcripts (un-official photocopies are acceptable until hiring). 
5. Three current letters of recommendation; 
Send completed applications and supporting material to: 
Salt Lake Community College 
Personnel Services Office 
4600 South Redwood Road 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Phone: 801-967-4210 
For a complete listing of all full-time positions available at Salt Lake Community College, call 801-967-4133. 
Women and Minorities are encouraged to apply. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 requires that work eligibility be documented for all new 
employees. Please be prepared to verify your eligibility for employment if hired at the College. 
SLCC-AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER 
